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ABSTRACT
In this paper, I outline the institutional 
and cultural aspects of parliamentary politics 
in Melanesia with the intention of charting 
areas apt for institutional strengthening and 
capacity building projects, and those that are 
not. The paper represents part of a wider survey 
of attitudes to parliaments and parliamentarians 
across Melanesia.
INTRODUCTION
This paper explores the institutional and 
cultural aspects of parliamentary politics in the 
Melanesian states Papua New Guinea, Solomon 
Islands, Vanuatu and Fiji, and in so doing seeks 
to provide a baseline of information about 
Melanesian parliamentary politics.1 The paper 
argues that executive dominance has become 
entrenched and normalised because of the 
interplay between parliamentary institutional 
design and the particular political cultures that 
have arisen in the Melanesian states. 
Much of the scepticism about the operation 
of Melanesian parliaments is derived from a set of 
basic premises. First, they are weak institutionally. 
The classical liberal philosophy that provides the 
basis for institutional expectations of parliaments’ 
and parliamentarians’ roles assumes that members 
of parliament shall take part in activities such as 
lawmaking, oversight and representation, and these 
technical aspects of parliamentary governance 
are poorly executed in Melanesia.2 Grassroots 
Melanesians often appear ambivalent about the 
roles of the parliament and parliamentarians. 
Similarly, they may be antagonistic or sceptical 
about the role of parliamentary politics, seeing 
in them frameworks for patronage rather than 
participation.3 National MPs are simultaneously 
characterised as profligate, opportunistic and 
corrupt. 
Parliaments and parliamentarians operate in 
conditions of worsening law and order, societal 
conflict and stalled development. In Vanuatu, 
endemic parliamentary instability brought 
policymaking and oversight virtually to a halt 
in the mid-to-late 1990s.4 In Solomon Islands, 
the inscrutability and instability of the national 
parliament precipitated the breakdown of social 
order, notably contributing to the bloody ethnic 
conflict that erupted in 1999, although clearly 
other factors were at play.5 These events have 
prompted the fear that the breakdown of effective 
and stable legislative functions will provide the 
preconditions for other, possibly worse, human 
tragedies. From the vantage point of Australia, and 
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other Western states, these factors have contributed 
to the categorisation of Melanesian states as ‘weak’, 
‘unstable’ and, in the case of Solomon Islands, 
‘failed’.6 Indeed, given the belief that Melanesian 
parliaments have decayed virtually in parallel with 
rising disenchantment with the state, it can often 
appear that weak parliamentary institutions, which 
promote or allow poor governance, cause many of 
the region’s problems.
However, focusing on these negative issues 
serves to obscure the local functions of Melanesian 
parliaments. Because legislatures persist in 
Melanesian polities and because membership 
in them is generally hotly contested, they are 
likely to perform manifest functions. That is, 
they endure because they are seen to have some 
use for local stakeholders. A particular feature of 
the Melanesian states is that activity within their 
legislatures has become predominantly focused 
upon constituting the executive; parliaments 
remain crucial sites of contestation for political 
power. Melanesian political cultures place 
emphasis on constituting the executive and stress 
the importance of dominating state resources.
Eschewing the conventional political science 
approach to power and politics, which focuses 
on institutions – parliaments, bureaucracies 
and parties – I seek to situate Melanesian 
parliaments in their broader national, political 
and social contexts;7 to explore both the cultural 
and institutional aspects of parliamentary 
politics. In recognising the processes that add 
up to parliamentary governance, including 
the emergence of distinct Melanesian political 
cultures, we can understand the functions of 
Melanesian parliaments and the locally perceived 
roles of their parliamentarians. Only then can we 
chart appropriate parliamentary strengthening 
projects. A secondary intention of this paper, 
therefore, is to predict some of the implications 
of institutional reform.8
The paper begins with an overview of 
legislative research in Melanesia and the Pacific 
Islands. It then examines the peculiar conditions 
of parliamentary politics in Melanesia where 
extant political cultures militate against the 
execution of MPs’ “institutional responsibilities” 
as lawmakers, overseers of government and 
community representatives/delegates. Taking up 
these themes, it examines the particular hindrances 
to the execution of these responsibilities and 
gives attention to recent attempts to make Pacific 
parliaments more effective and representative, 
namely programs aimed to encourage civil society 
to participate in parliament, those directed 
towards strengthening political parties and those 
intended to advance the position of women in 
public decision-making.
RESEARCH-REFORM LINKAGES
While governance in the Pacific Islands has, 
generally, received consistent academic scrutiny 
over the past decade,9 parliament – the apex 
of the Westminster system of government and 
arguably the pinnacle of the ‘state’ – has received 
relatively little systematic attention. Not since 
Norman Meller’s benchmark research in the 60s, 
70s and 80s have Pacific legislatures – let alone 
Melanesian ones – been subject to intensive 
study.10 In the mid-1980s, students of comparative 
politics shifted their focus away from research on 
legislatures because they were not seen to be the 
locus of actual rule making and administrative 
regulation, a shift consistent with earlier research 
trends in Asian and African studies.11 Pacific 
research agendas – including Meller’s – shifted 
to address the rise and interaction of dominant 
groups;12 leadership styles, including those of 
elected representatives;13 the apparent lack of fit 
between introduced systems of government and 
pre-existing or coexisting autochthonous ones;14 
political parties;15 and the potential for electoral 
engineering to ameliorate societal conflict.16 
In recent years, parliaments – and Melanesian 
parliaments in particular – have come under 
renewed international scrutiny. Given the 
centrality of the legislature to the Westminster 
system, it was inevitable that development 
planners would eventually target it as a potential 
means of improving systems of government. 
The United Nations Development Program’s 
(UNDP) governance projects – Governance 
& Sustainable Human Development Program 
(GSHDP) and Governance for Livelihoods and 
Development (GOLD) – have made parliamentary 
strengthening projects core activities since 1999. 
Since 2000, meeting the demands of regional 
presiding officers, the GOLD project undertook 
several research projects on Pacific legislatures.17 
Countering the perceived capacity weakness of 
Pacific parliamentarians was central to training 
programs for parliamentarians conducted by the 
United Nations ESCAP secretariat, AusAID and 
United Kingdom Department for International 
Development (UKDFID) beginning in the 
late 1990s. The Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association has involved Pacific countries in its 
programs since their independence and is in the 
process of devolving secretariat duties for Pacific 
programs to a Pacific Islands country. Using the 
UNDP’s earlier research, the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) targeted Vanuatu’s parliament as 
part of its overall plan for institutional reform 
there, citing the apparent inability of Vanuatu’s 
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This has allowed the leaders of minority parties 
to take the position, and may in future allow 
an independent to become Prime Minister. The 
ability of legislatures to topple executives has 
come under scrutiny in Melanesia in recent 
years due to the increasingly commonplace 
moves to oust governments during the term of 
parliament through motions of no confidence. 
Bar Fiji, in each of the Melanesian states, options 
have been explored for limiting the ability of 
the legislature to topple executives, to foster 
greater parliamentary stability. The most notable 
example of this is Papua New Guinea’s 2001 
Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties 
and Candidates (OLIPPAC), which was enacted 
to limit the ‘chronic instability of governments in 
the absence of a strong party system.’26 Although 
amended in 2003, the results of these reforms are 
as yet unclear. 
MELANESIAN POLITICAL CULTURES
While they may differ in magnitude and effect, 
common behaviour has developed around formal 
state institutions in Melanesia, which are distinct 
from parliamentary behaviour in other Pacific 
and Western countries, such as Australia, and 
which confound the institutional expectations 
of members of parliament, as laid out in their 
respective constitutions, laws and standing 
orders. Despite the variations in institutional 
design mentioned above, common practices have 
emerged in parliamentary politics that suggest 
the emergence of a Melanesian political culture, 
or a Melanesian style of parliamentary politics.27
Gledhill argues that ‘the Western tradition 
of political analysis places excessive emphasis 
on the state and the formal … institutions of 
government.’28 In this paper, the state, its formal 
institutions and actors take centre stage, but 
my intention is to contextualise them within 
their cultural settings, to move away from the 
‘excessive emphasis’ on institutions. Drawing 
on select anthropological and political science 
theory, political culture may be defined loosely 
as the sets of actions and values that define 
and guide political behaviour.29 As with any 
definition of culture, political culture does not 
deny ‘struggles of meanings and representations’, 
acknowledging that ‘culture’ at every turn may be 
asserted, contested and transformed.30 Without 
reducing Melanesians to a singular type and 
without glossing over the real variations in 
structure, agency and history between and within 
the Melanesian states, there are discernible 
similarities in elite, parliamentary behaviour.
parliament to ‘review bills and policies’.18 In post-
conflict Solomon Islands, AusAID and UNDP 
are cooperating on a parliamentary strengthening 
project. 
Clearly, the health of Pacific legislatures 
is increasingly subject to outside inspection, 
and – but for a handful of cases – the image 
that emerges is gloomy.19 Indeed, the resurgent 
interest in Melanesian parliaments from both 
academics and policy-makers is clearly linked 
to the apparent deterioration of parliamentary 
functions. There are few such explicit examples 
of policy driving the research agenda as this. 
Consequently, a handful of articles has been 
written by regional academics, such as University 
of Papua New Guinea political science lecturer, 
Henry Okole.20 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Given their emergence from British 
colonialism in the 1970s and 1980s, each of the 
Melanesian states inherited a Westminster origin 
parliamentary system, although in size and design 
each varies markedly from the others. Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji possess the two largest 
legislatures: Papua New Guinea’s 109 members 
include 20 provincial MPs and 89 open seats; Fiji’s 
House of Representatives consists of 71 members 
elected from ethnically differentiated communal 
rolls and open seats (and a Speaker nominated 
from outside the House’s membership).21 Fiji 
is the lone bicameral system in Melanesia, 
possessing a Senate, consisting of 32 members 
appointed by the President, which acts as a house 
of review.22 The Solomon Islands parliament 
consists of 50 members elected from single 
member constituencies. Formerly a conjoint 
colony between Britain and France, Vanuatu 
possesses a 52-seat legislature elected from single 
non-transferable vote constituencies.23
Like Westminster style governments around 
the world, the Melanesian states are unified 
by their requirement that executive power be 
constituted from the legislature – either through 
parliamentary elections or by the dominant 
parliamentary party – and that the executive 
‘remain responsible to the legislature’.24 A 
particular feature of these parliaments is that the 
appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister 
are the responsibilities of the parliament, rather 
than the head of state.25 Vanuatu’s legislature 
is notable because the parliament is invested 
with the power to elect the Prime Minister from 
among its members, irrespective of whether the 
candidate is the leader of the majority party. 
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Bearing these qualifications in mind, the 
following sections discuss the effects of local 
political cultures on parliamentary behaviour. 
Beginning with an exploration of local political 
settings, the section then shifts focus to discuss 
the effects of grassroots’ expectations, actions and 
agency on elite political behaviour.
Local political cultures
Arguably, the drivers of parliamentary politics 
are to be found in the encompassing atmosphere 
of the constituency and it is here that the cultural 
argument is the most compelling. Given the 
state’s relatively recent imposition in Melanesia, 
there is considerable ambivalence about it, as 
there is about parliament and democracy. The 
hegemony of the nation and the dominance 
of the state are challenged by salient regional, 
ethnic or religious identities. A brief survey 
of recent anthropological and ethno-historical 
literature suggests that nationalism in Melanesia is 
weak, contested or absent.31 Where Melanesians 
– rural and urban – engage with the state, they 
often treat it with a high degree of suspicion or 
antagonism.32
Part of the legacy of statehood is the growing 
sense that independence has created wealthy 
urban elites, at the expense of ‘grassroots’ 
Melanesians. Governments can often appear 
distant and uninterested in local people’s lives. 
For example, Kragur people in East Sepik, PNG, 
‘sense…the distance that separates them…
from the indigenous governmental elite’.33 
Occupying the state’s apex, the parliament and 
parliamentarians are subject to similar censure. 
In rural areas of northern Vanuatu, for example, 
parliamentary democracy is seen to contribute to 
the erosion of community cohesion and benefit 
no one but a political elite. In northern Vanuatu, 
an Ambae man, who had formerly been an 
advocate of independence and Westminster-style 
democracy, told me: ‘We elected these people 
[MPs] to free us and all they do is oppress us’.34
Certainly, Melanesian MPs are characterised 
as self-serving. Public office has become an 
attractive opportunity for personal and group 
gain. Election to national parliament offers local 
people avenues for becoming more influential 
big men and gaining greater access to state 
resources for redistribution. As Sinclair Dinnen 
argues: ‘Government ministers [use] their official 
powers to appropriate entire national policies 
or divert public resources to their own personal 
agendas’.35 National leaders may believe ‘that the 
accumulation of wealth is an essential element of 
political status’.36 
Given these beliefs, it is understandable that 
scholars and local people, including national 
political leaders, highlight the disjunctures 
between Western and local understandings of 
Westminster’s viability and appropriateness.37 
Arguments about the harmony between local and 
introduced forms of government emerged almost 
as soon as the question of decolonisation was 
raised in Melanesia, and they have not stopped 
since.38 Most analyses of the state in Melanesia 
suggest that pre-existing social forms pervade the 
state at almost every level.39 For example, the 
Papua New Guinean anthropologist, Joe Ketan, 
argues that ‘politics at all levels…are organised 
along traditional structural lines’.40 Intensely 
local forms of social control are stronger than 
the order – or disorder – imposed by the state.41 
As Bronwen Douglas suggests, Melanesian states 
are notable for their awkward fit between the 
Westminster system with its ‘capitalist models 
of ideal relationships between the individual, 
the state and civil society’ and the indigenous 
socialities of kinship and community.42
Drawing on these networks of ‘kinship and 
community’, providing access to state resources 
in the form of development funds, projects and 
policies, as well as employment, education and 
travel, offers one of the most viable means for 
MPs to cement local support. This is reinforced 
by the weakness of the state in delivering services 
to rural areas. For their part, local people demand 
reciprocity from their MPs as they do from the 
state. In Solomon Islands, MPs are expected 
to do little more than ensure ‘returns for their 
community once…in’.43 Paula Brown suggests: 
‘people have come to regard government as 
the major…source of opportunity and finance. 
Having a friend in national government is seen as 
necessary for economic success.’44 According to 
Jeffrey Clark, while the state may be considered 
to be ‘liminal and ambiguous’ by the Wiru 
in Southern Highlands, situated between 
the norms and expectations of the tribe and 
engagement with the institutional forms of order 
and control, it is often understood to be akin to 
a distant bigman, who provides gifts, materials 
and wealth.45 The belief that political leaders, 
rather than impartial state services, are the most 
bankable avenues for resource distribution now 
characterises Melanesian politics.46 For many 
Melanesians, wantokism naturally influences 
employment prospects.47 It is for these reasons 
that Laurence Goldman argues that politics in 
Papua New Guinea are commonly more about 
patronage than participation, a characterisation, 
moreover that may be applied more generally in 
Melanesia.48
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Ron May suggests that the net effect of these 
forces disenchants voters and donors:
the tendency to place short-term 
expediency and the demands of individual 
MPs above longer-term national 
objectives…has impacted adversely on 
state capacity and fostered cynicism among 
ordinary people and frustration on the part 
of aid donors and ﬁnancial institutions.…
[I]t is these developments which diminish 
the perceived legitimacy of the state.49
Yet, individual MPs’ support is based not 
on their record of governance, but on their 
reciprocity. MPs who do not fulfil their obligations 
in these respects may be subject to threats and 
violence for failing to meet their reciprocal 
responsibilities.50 At the very least, unresponsive 
MPs face the unattractive prospect of not being 
re-elected. 
While the dynamics may vary in intensity 
between and within the Melanesian states, they 
offer a salutary reminder that Melanesian MPs, 
like all Melanesians, are enmeshed in networks 
of social and financial obligation, and that this 
often influences their actions as elected officials. 
It is important, therefore, not to characterise 
Melanesians as irretrievably at odds with their 
MPs. Melanesian people are often outwardly 
supportive of projects aimed at holding their 
elected representatives, particularly their 
ministers, to account, although in practice they 
may find the requisite infrastructure programs 
with their attendant influxes of foreign advisors 
threatening. Moreover, protestations about 
the poor quality of elected leadership may be 
particularly strong when Melanesians lament 
the deterioration of their quality of life since 
the ending of colonialism, a common, although 
complex, way of pillorying national leaders.51 
However, there is an ambivalence underscoring 
these aspects of political culture. On the one 
hand, Melanesians deride national politicians for 
their profligacy, opportunism, corrupt practices, 
incompetence and inefficiency. On the other, 
they simultaneously take part in the activities that 
characterise state malfunctioning in Melanesia. 
Arguably, it is their expectations that motor the 
political economies of resource distribution that 
characterise parliamentary politics and which 
impel Melanesian MPs to join the executive, at 
all costs.
Parliamentary behaviour
Governments in Melanesia are often formed 
by unwieldy or flimsy coalitions, without 
ideological coherence and unified primarily by 
the pragmatic considerations of attaining access 
to state resources.52 With the possible exception 
of Fiji, coalition governments have proved 
precarious, being beleaguered by competition 
over ministerial posts. Parliamentary factions 
congregate around one or more powerful 
individuals, who are linked to their junior party 
members and other parliamentarians by complex 
arrangements of reciprocity and patronage. 
Coalition member parties often show little 
respect for coalition fidelity, preferring rather 
to progress upwardly within governments, with 
the intention of claiming the post of Prime 
Minister – the position which dominates control 
of state resources and therefore represents the 
most powerful position from which to organise 
coalitions – or one of the other preferred 
portfolios. In turn, a particular responsibility 
of Melanesian prime ministers has become 
the mediation of contending claims, through 
inducements (money, ministerial portfolios, 
the appointment of political adherents and 
wantoks to party and bureaucratic positions) and 
sanctions (censure, expulsion). Simultaneously, 
allegiances to political parties have weakened 
as national politicians have adopted pragmatic 
and opportunistic attitudes to attaining positions 
within government coalitions, therefore lessening 
the importance of ideological differences between 
members. MPs also give particular attention to 
attaining influence over utilities and placing 
allies and party-members on governing boards 
of state-owned enterprises. These positions 
represent important strategic points from which 
to distribute resources and thereby strengthen 
political alliances. The responsibilities of 
parliaments and parliamentarians outlined by 
classical liberal theorists, which form the core of 
institutional expectations of parliaments, have 
become subordinated to these factional contests. 
The manoeuvring required by these processes 
has mostly excluded policymaking and lawmaking 
from the public and transparent realms of 
parliamentary debate, to in camera cabinet, party 
room and ‘resort’ discussions, which leave the 
public, many partisans and even members of 
the government unaware of the implications 
and means of political machination. Their 
intensity oftentimes diverts the attention of 
Melanesian MPs from parliamentary procedures. 
Many of the problems facing Melanesian 
parliaments are determined by the time it takes 
any given Melanesian MP to negotiate the 
tensions mentioned above; to navigate a path to 
(relative) power in any parliament; simply, to be 
elected and enter government. These tendencies 
necessarily propel political centrifugalism within 
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the parliamentary parties and, therefore, within 
the national parliament. The importance of 
the social cleavages or policy platforms that 
differentiate parliamentary political parties is 
lessened by the need for pragmatism, with the 
imperatives of patronage and pay-offs being 
emphasised.
The effect of these machinations on policy 
is also clear. Melanesian executives are driven 
to extreme ends to raise the funds necessary to 
maintain their hold on power. For example, after 
the 2004 elections in Vanuatu, Serge Vohor, 
at the head of an increasingly brittle coalition 
and an internally fractious party (the Union of 
Moderate Parties), opened diplomatic relations 
with Taiwan, despite Vanuatu’s One China 
Policy, to access the funds needed to pay-off 
dissident coalition and party members. In this 
instance, the vicissitudes of factional politics 
and the desire to stay in office regardless of the 
implications were perceptibly driving policy.
EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE
The de-emphasising of lawmaking and 
oversight of the executive in favour of reciprocity, 
as outlined above, serves to bolster the ability 
of Melanesian governments to sideline the 
parliament in issues of day-to-day governance. 
The emphasis on constituting the executive 
in Melanesian parliaments subordinates the 
importance of the technical parliamentary 
aspects of interrogating government performance 
and formulating laws to the immediate concerns 
of constituting the executive. This serves to 
upturn the institutional expectations on MPs and 
allows the relative ease with which executives 
push through their legislative and policy agendas. 
Indeed, Melanesian parliaments often appear to 
provide only the rubber stamp to the executive’s 
programs. The notable exceptions to executive 
dominance are the commonplace motions of 
no confidence through which regime change 
often takes place in Melanesia. In contemporary 
Melanesian politics, most executives supported 
by development actors are seeking to limit this 
mechanism because it has served to entrench 
political instability.53
Arguably, executive dominance is allowed 
to continue because no critical mass has been 
generated among constituents to fundamentally 
alter the patronage politics that have arisen 
in Melanesia. The inbuilt expectations for 
effective oversight are diluted by the relative 
paucity of information about parliaments 
and MPs’ responsibilities among grassroots 
constituents.54 While the deliberations of Pacific 
parliaments are generally broadcast, and have 
been in most instances since independence, 
awareness of the content and implications of 
legislation is poor. Systems for disseminating 
information to constituents about parliament 
and for representing constituency aspirations 
in law making are weak. Local understandings 
of the roles and duties of members are unclear. 
Melanesians rarely differentiate between the 
executive, the bureaucracy and the legislature; 
all are aggregated simply under the rubric of 
gavman.55 For example, many Melanesians 
believe that MPs may legitimately divert state 
resources to local needs.
Executive dominance is also allowed by 
elements of the design of formal state institutions. 
To ensure that their legislative agendas are passed, 
Melanesian governments often expedite the 
progress of bills through the house by the strategic 
suspension of standing orders, and this has 
become part of the armoury of most Melanesian 
governments. The reasons for suspending standing 
orders are legion: for example, sometimes standing 
orders are suspended because executives simply 
have not had draft bills ready early enough to 
be submitted to the secretariat for notification; 
sometimes it is because executives wish to avoid 
awkward or intense parliamentary debates.
In most instances, no debate is allowed 
on motions to suspend standing orders. In the 
absence of any other business for parliaments to 
deal with, presiding officers generally allow such 
procedures to be used in this manner. Moreover, 
many speakers of parliament are partisan. Thus, 
even if they chose to fulfil their responsibilities, 
many parliamentarians would be unable to amend 
proposed legislation in parliament. Nonetheless, 
these widely used tactics demonstrate an 
astute reading of the rules and regulations of 
parliament.
To counter the personal executive excesses, 
development actors have advocated strengthened 
oversight mechanisms, such as strengthened 
ombudsmen and leadership codes. To counter 
the systemic aspects of executive dominance, 
mechanisms such as committee systems have been 
created. However, this is possibly creating gulfs 
between the agendas of development actors and 
local executives. There is no global consensus about 
the appropriate level of oversight required for an 
effective parliament. The issue of strengthening 
the oversight capacity of parliaments in the 
Pacific has become increasingly vexatious, with 
two basic schools of thought emerging. On the 
one hand, development agencies, such as UNDP, 
and supported by the Forum Presiding Officer’s 
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public expectations within the parliament and 
to strengthen the parliament’s ability to hold the 
executive to account. In particular, strengthening 
Public Accounts Committees (PACs) has become 
a prominent strategy employed to foster better 
oversight in parliament, primarily because in 
their operation the expenditure of public funds 
merges with the representative and oversight 
roles of parliamentarians. Yet PACs are also often 
criticised for their apparent inertia. Committee 
members often lack the requisite knowledge to 
interview experienced public servants effectively 
and are generally unable to use their powers 
– such as the ability to subpoena public servants. 
In Vanuatu, Solomon Islands and PNG their 
effectiveness is undermined by the inability of 
the bureaucracy to scrutinise its own expenditure 
systematically, thereby lessening the ability of 
public servants to report adequately to the PAC 
on their operation. Where they are effective, 
most PACs are dealing with problems in arrears; 
sometimes they are still considering events from 
the early 1990s. The problem remains that 
PACs, while guided by quite comprehensive and 
appropriate regulations and legislation, are still 
ineffective.58 Most PACs are simply ignored by 
their governments. However, in PNG and Fiji 
they have succeeded in generating media interest 
in preferential loan schemes, misappropriations 
of public funds and so on.
Stronger provisions for relevant civil society 
actors, such as professional accountants, to be co-
opted to PACs has been suggested to enable the 
non-political review of the expenditure of public 
funds and to increase the technical capabilities of 
PACs. Civil society actors have been targeted for 
capacity building and institutional strengthening to 
provide public checks and balances and opposition 
MPs have been empowered through amendments 
to standing orders or legally. For example, in Fiji 
and Vanuatu, the chair of the Public Accounts 
Committee must be an opposition member. This 
style of adversarial oversight dominates UNDP 
thinking on accountability mechanisms but it 
is by no means the only system in operation 
in the Pacific and it is not the only system 
advocated by development agencies such as the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Pacific 
Financial Technical Assistance Centre (PFTAC). 
In Vanuatu, the insistence upon an opposition 
chair in the PAC is seen potentially to cultivate 
political antagonism within that committee. That 
is, the competition that paralyses the national 
parliament may be replicated in the confines of 
this nine-member group.
Conference (FPOC) – the principal forum for the 
presidents and speakers of the region’s legislatures 
– tend to favour stronger oversight to regulate 
key industries or portfolios and limit government 
excesses, corruption and maladministration.56
The region’s executives, however, often 
voice concern that their ability to govern is 
already hampered by factors such as political 
fragmentation, and suggest that sufficient 
oversight and representation mechanisms are 
built in to their respective electoral systems 
already. Arguably, this merely represents a defence 
of their dominance of the legislature, but two key 
issues must be kept in mind. First, in that the 
Westminster system vests in the executive the right 
to initiate or move to increase appropriations and 
taxes, the executive is invested with significant 
powers to determine policy and legislative 
programs: few government MPs ultimately want 
this situation to be upset. Thus, while recognising 
that certain modification may be needed, their 
position is that executives should be left to do 
what they are elected to do – govern. Second, 
some of the strongest advocates for improved 
oversight mechanisms base their positions on 
ostensibly political positions. Fijian Labour Party 
MPs routinely advocate strengthened oversight 
mechanisms, in part because – despite a series 
of court cases – they are sceptical that they will 
again join the executive’s ranks.
Committees
Each of the Melanesian parliaments possesses 
a committee system, including house committees 
and select or sectoral committees, to scrutinise 
legislation and deliberate on relevant government 
policy.57 Although designed to strengthen oversight 
and lawmaking procedures, the performance of 
the committee system in Melanesia has been 
criticised as ineffective and costly: attendance at 
committee meetings is generally poor, they often 
deliberate on backdated issues and community 
consultation is rarely effected. The propensity 
of MPs to take their committee allowances 
without fulfilling these responsibilities makes 
the committee system – potentially a mechanism 
for ensuring oversight and fostering community 
consultation on lawmaking – appear to be a 
further self-serving organ of inefficient and 
ineffective state apparatuses. In Vanuatu, for 
example, the Members Privileges Committee 
has sat three times between its creation in 1998 
and 2001 and each time voted only to raise MP 
allowances.
However, committees remain popular targets 
for institutional strengthening because they are 
designed to facilitate better acknowledgment of 
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THE CAPACITY OF MPS
A commonly cited reason for executive 
dominance in Melanesia is the limited capacity 
of MPs, particularly their lack of knowledge 
about their roles and responsibilities as defined by 
their standing orders and privileges acts.59 Many 
representatives have limited formal education 
and no doubt find some technical briefings and 
training sessions difficult. Disarmed by their 
inability to tackle government legislation on 
technical matters, Melanesian MPs have allowed 
much of it to pass largely as tabled.
Preparing new MPs for their roles in public life 
– outlining their responsibilities as lawmakers, as 
overseers of the executive arm of government and 
as representative of their constituents – is clearly 
necessary for the effective operation of any 
parliament. The high turnover of MPs – about 
50% serve only one term in parliament60 – means 
that many new members have little time to learn 
their roles. Although induction courses for MPs 
are becoming more frequent, few secretariats have 
been able to provide adequate induction sessions 
for their members at the beginning of each 
Parliament in their own right, responsibilities 
which have fallen to development projects, or 
which have been undertaken with significant 
support from the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association (CPA), UNDP and other institutions. 
While MPs clearly need and desire training in 
their roles, the basic unsustainability of capacity 
building for them – given their high turn over 
– suggests that parliamentary secretariats, not 
politicians, are apt targets for strengthening 
projects. This is certainly true if the ability of 
secretariats to induct MPs at the beginning of a 
term of parliament is to be bolstered.
Members themselves often complain that 
they receive inadequate information about bills 
from either their own party executives or their 
respective parliamentary secretariats, suggesting 
that many MPs take their roles seriously but 
are unable to change the underlying structures 
which govern parliamentary behaviour, 
particularly relating to the factional politics 
mentioned above. Indeed, during the GOLD 
project’s research among Melanesian MPs, 
parliamentarians complained in specific terms 
about the lack of adequate secretarial support 
that hampers their ability to fulfil their roles. 
Put simply, many Melanesian MPs argued that 
the major hindrances to their responsibilities of 
representation, lawmaking and oversight were 
created by insufficient infrastructure. 
Most parliamentary secretariats admit major 
systemic weaknesses in their ability to support 
their MPs adequately. Despite the implementation 
of piecemeal initiatives undertaken already 
through diplomatic posts’ discretionary funds 
or through direct programs between Australian, 
New Zealand clerks’ offices and regional 
secretariats, parliamentary secretariats in Solomon 
Islands and Vanuatu remain underfunded and 
understaffed. The larger secretariats in Papua 
New Guinea and Fiji also suffer from severe staff 
and resource constraints. For reasons of logistics, 
many secretariats are without Internet and 
CD-ROM capable computers, a major problem 
given that the Forum Secretariat now provides 
documentation on its protocols via CD-ROM. 
Most regional parliamentary secretariats 
suggest that the constitutional and legal 
arrangements which created these offices and 
which guide their operation are part of the 
problem. Most parliamentary secretariats demand 
greater autonomy from the parliament or from 
their respective public service commissions to 
determine their financial requirements and 
recruitment processes. Problems have arisen in 
Fiji, for example, because the House Committee, 
responsible for setting the parliament’s operating 
budget, has provided insufficient funding. Specialist 
parliamentary staff, such as Hansard reporters, 
hired by the Public Service Commission, has 
been relocated to other departments arbitrarily. 
In Vanuatu during the 1990s, a cash-strapped 
government stripped the office of the clerk and 
diverted funds to financial crises elsewhere in the 
bureaucracy. 
However, to suggest that Melanesian MPs 
are uniformly under-skilled is to provide an 
incomplete and misleading picture. While they 
appear ineffectual in key technical functions, 
when necessary Melanesian parliamentarians 
are able to utilise parliamentary procedures 
to expedite legislation or outmanoeuvre their 
parliamentary rivals. Governments often use 
parliamentary procedures to secure their hold on 
office. For example, facing a mobilised opposition 
and possible rebellion within its own ranks in the 
May 2004 sitting of parliament in Papua New 
Guinea, the Somare government stacked the 
membership of the Private Members’ Committee, 
which controls the introduction of motions of no 
confidence into the House, thereby limiting a 
major threat to the government’s ability to enact 
its programs.
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CIVIL SOCIETY
Westminster systems of government predicate 
oversight of the executive at least partially on 
an informed and active ‘civil society’. With 
the intention of bridging the information gaps 
between parliaments and people, aid agencies 
have placed greater emphasis on civic education 
to be offered at primary, secondary and tertiary 
levels and on an ad hoc basis to instil greater 
understanding and acceptance of formal state 
institutions among rural Melanesians.61 Only Fiji 
has an established civic education component 
in the schools curriculum, although several PICs 
are reputedly developing courses in collaboration 
with donors and NGOs such as Transparency 
International (TI). The insistence on ‘good 
governance’ training at USP combined with the 
creation of the new Pacific Institute of Advanced 
Studies in Development and Governance provide 
avenues for effective regional strategies for civic 
education for tertiary students, in addition to 
advanced training in research methods, academic 
writing and so on. While these strategies 
target younger generations of Melanesians, the 
educating of people in parliamentary processes is 
largely ad hoc. Organisations such as Vanuatu’s 
Wan Smol Bag theatre group provide accessible 
and appropriate formats for the dissemination 
of information on issues of governance, politics, 
and legal and constitutional issues, but they are 
unable to substitute for schools curricula.
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have 
come to be seen as potential, effective democratic 
controls on elite behaviour and effective means 
by which the concentrated problems of poor 
economic performance and crises of legitimacy in 
developing countries might be rectified. Including 
churches, trade unions, non-government 
organisations (NGOs) involved in lobbying and 
advocacy on particular issues, Pacific CSOs might 
provide the basis for an informed, active and 
mobilised public. However, their effectiveness 
in penetrating decision-making circles has been 
limited. Many are organisationally weak and lack 
local legitimacy. Those CSOs with strong local 
legitimacy, such as churches, are often reluctant 
to influence government policy on certain issues 
and may in fact be ignored largely by MPs on policy 
matters. Relations between NGOs and Pacific 
governments are routinely tense, as are relations 
between NGOs themselves. When NGOs oppose 
government initiatives – part of the Western 
expectation of civil society – they have been 
targeted for prosecution. In 2001, in the process 
of establishing itself, the interim government of 
Laesenia Qarase suppressed civil society activism. 
The Citizens Constitutional Forum – an NGO 
critical of the government – was deregistered and 
its advertising was banned from public broadcast 
media. Similarly, in Vanuatu, NGO organised 
demonstrations have been banned; in PNG they 
have been forcibly quashed, resulting in civilian 
casualties.
In key instances they have broken down the 
insularity of the executive, both through their 
own agency and with the support of parliamentary 
secretariats. In the Pacific Islands, where 
communication networks are often limited, where 
members of parliament often appear inaccessible 
to the constituents, CSOs, including churches 
and NGOs, are able to act as intermediaries on 
issues of social relevance. Already, NGOs created 
to champion specific issues – such as the Fiji 
Women’s Rights Movement – are involved in 
advocating legislative change, participating in 
policy discussions through consultative forums 
and contributing to public education programs. 
Given that certain bills before parliament may 
not be accessible to rural or undereducated people 
– who nonetheless are affected by legislation 
– NGOs offer avenues for the dissemination of 
information on their content and ramifications. 
In Fiji, the Secretary General of Parliament 
commissions briefing papers from relevant NGOs 
to strengthen committee work, which provides an 
example of how effective support institutions may 
contribute to better parliamentary functions. 
Recognising that the committee system 
does not operate effectively in Melanesia, new 
institutions have been created to try to strengthen 
the linkages between states and societies. Given 
the weaknesses in formal parliamentary committee 
systems across Melanesia, several strategies outside 
the direct control of parliament – but involving 
MPs – such as the Consultative Implementation 
and Monitoring Council (CIMC) in PNG and a 
system of national summits in Vanuatu have been 
created to bridge the divide between government 
and people. However, in that these institutions 
appear to draw the responsibilities of community 
representation and liaison further away from the 
orbit of national parliaments and MPs they may 
provide further disincentives to MPs to fulfil their 
institutional expectations. Their creation suggests 
that some degree of institutional harmonisation 
or rationalisation must be undertaken to avoid 
the duplication of scarce government resources.
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POLITICAL PARTIES
An issue of increasing prominence in 
Melanesia is the apparent weakness of political 
parties. They are often characterised as being 
arbitrary and ephemeral, or institutionally weak.62 
They appear prone to fragmentation because of 
the highly personalised nature of Melanesian 
politics.63 Consequently, candidates often trade 
on personal qualities and their connection to 
particular constituents, rather than party-based 
platforms. Established parties with centralised 
administrative functions can often appear 
unresponsive to local needs. In Vanuatu, electoral 
results indicate a shift away from the major 
parties to minor parties and independents, which 
in turn implies the subordination of national 
concerns (e.g. good governance) to intensely 
local ones (local development, responsive local 
representation, access to development funds). 
This is exemplified by increasing support for 
locally credible candidates whose major platforms 
are local development above all else.64 As argued 
above, the political cultures of Melanesia lend 
themselves to patronage politics because of local 
peoples’ needs for approachable political leaders. 
No Melanesian MP can afford to ignore local 
demands in favour of national or regional ones 
because unfulfilled promises to constituencies 
carry with them the threat of electoral defeat 
and a host of other negative social sanctions. 
Of course, the high turnover of MPs in the 
Melanesian states suggests that fulfilling election 
promises is no easy task, not least because of the 
demands placed upon MPs by the intense factional 
politics surrounding election to parliament and 
the formation of governments.
In recent years, political parties have become 
increasingly popular targets for strengthening 
democratic institutions, based on the belief that 
they are major indicators of social cleavages and 
that stronger parties will lead to more effective 
legislatures and more stable societies.65 No 
consensus exists among these development actors 
as to the best means of engaging with political 
parties and most active development actors are 
cautious about the prospects of engaging with them 
at all. The focus of most political party support by 
UNDP tends to be on institutional strengthening 
and capacity building, especially party operating 
structures, campaign strategies, candidate pre-
selection and the role of parties in legislatures.66 
Many UNDP support strategies, however, were 
formulated to strengthen democratic politics 
in post-conflict or newly democratic countries, 
which may not be appropriate for the purposes 
of strengthening democracy in the Melanesian 
states. Organisations such as the Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy (WFD), the Australian 
Political Exchange Bureau, the State, Society 
and Governance in Melanesia Project, Centre 
for Democratic Institutions (CDI) and America’s 
National Democratic Institute (NDI) facilitate 
visits by Pacific politicians to Australia, the 
United Kingdom or the United States – or vice 
versa – and fund them to accompany politicians 
on constituency visits. Certainly strategies such 
as these offer politicians comparative experiences. 
Clearly, those MPs most apt for initiatives such as 
these are newly elected MPs.
The point of these exercises is clearly to 
improve the individual capacity of MPs but they 
rarely get to the heart of the major issues facing 
parliaments and parliamentarians over the long-
term. Despite the apparent lack of skills of MPs 
across Melanesia, political fragmentation and 
patronage politics, not incompetence, provide the 
most prominent obstacles to effective government. 
Without the emergence of broad social cleavages 
around which parties can mobilise and without 
the curtailing of party fragmentation, Melanesian 
parliamentarians are unlikely to change their 
ways. Thus, it may be naïve and implicitly 
paternalistic to expect Pacific MPs to renounce 
their ways of doing things overnight, especially 
without viable alternative strategies being 
presented. To return to a point made earlier, many 
established MPs are not quite as ignorant about 
the frameworks of parliament as they may appear. 
They are operating within political cultures 
with their own sets of norms and assumptions. 
Ignoring the expectations of electors in favour 
of seemingly abstract principles of governance 
advocated by Western countries might not be 
the best way for Melanesian MPs to be elected to 
parliament in the first instance, and there is little 
consolation in not being elected. The point is not 
to suggest that little can be done to strengthen 
political parties, elections and parliamentary 
performance but that whatever the strategies for 
improving parliamentary governance advocated, 
due consideration be given to the parameters 
of acceptable behaviour and shared meanings 
in which Melanesian MPs must operate, and 
realistic expectations of the probable success 
or failure of initiatives of this kind be held. 
Certainly, changing the political cultures that 
have arisen in Melanesia will be a long and 
arduous process, and doomed to failure without 
associated shifts in local public perceptions about 
acceptable political behaviour.
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WOMEN IN PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING
In addition to their resistance to stimuli 
from civil society actors, Melanesian parliaments 
offer few avenues for improving women’s 
roles in public decision-making. Despite their 
increasing employment in the upper echelons 
of government bureaucracies throughout 
Melanesia, women remain under-represented in 
the region’s legislatures. Most of Melanesia, even 
where matriliny predominates, is patriarchal. 
Thus, while there are no explicit legal barriers 
preventing women from running for office, 
women are impeded at every step along the 
route to election to national parliament. This 
resistance is often couched in terms of tradition, 
Christian principles and gendered assumptions 
about leadership. In Papua New Guinea, only 
four women have been elected to parliament. 
Solomon Islands have only ever had one woman 
elected to parliament. Vanuatu has now elected 
four women; two have become ministers. Of all 
the small islands states, Fiji has the strongest 
representation of women in national parliament, 
arguably reflecting the comparatively stronger 
position of women within Fijian society. In 2002, 
there were eight national representatives, five in 
the lower house and four who held ministries.
Few women run for election to local, regional 
or national assemblies, although organisations 
such as UNIFEM – the United Nations Fund for 
Women – are engaged in advocacy and capacity-
building programs across the region. Throughout 
the Pacific – even where concrete initiatives have 
been taken to strengthen the position of women 
in society generally and in public decision-making 
specifically – empowerment programs have had 
only limited effect. International agencies and 
local NGOs have focused on achievable reforms 
such as ensuring that laws are drafted in non-
gender specific language and supporting legal and 
political literacy programs for grassroots women 
with an eye to facilitating the advancement of 
women at all levels of society, with mixed success. 
Even UNIFEM acknowledges that a key problem 
it faces in furthering women’s participation in 
public decision-making is that many programs 
tend to corral women away from men. This can 
be useful in building women’s networks but it 
generally reinforces existing problems.
Throughout Melanesia, while political parties 
publicly acknowledge the value of electoral 
support from women, change has been slow. 
Despite PNG’s Organic Law on the Integrity on 
Political Parties and Candidates (OLIPPAC), under 
which women candidates who receive 10 percent 
or more of the votes shall have three quarters 
of their campaign expenses refunded by Central 
Fund Board of Management to the political party 
that endorsed them, few parties have put women 
candidates forward.67 In Vanuatu, UNIFEM 
supported the creation of the Vanuatu Women in 
Politics (VANWIP) Project in 1995 to encourage 
women to run for public office. In the 1995 and 
1998 elections, the major parties were forced 
to deploy women members to campaign against 
VANWIP candidates actively in their electorates. 
While no VANWIP candidate was elected, each 
of the major parties consequently incorporated 
some level of gender recognition into their 
respective platforms, recognising potential 
payoffs in the form of electoral support. The 
actual effects of this platform shift were limited. 
Only the VP incorporated detailed strategies for 
women’s empowerment to its party platform in a 
detailed manner, although most parties now have 
women representatives on their executives or 
support women’s election in principle.
Certain lessons can be drawn from prior 
attempts to support women’s election to public 
office. By contesting Vanuatu’s 1995 and 1998 
elections on non-partisan pro-women platforms, 
VANWIP candidates increased public awareness 
of the issues surrounding under-representation of 
women but in neither instance was a candidate 
elected. Given the efforts of UNIFEM and 
VANWIP mentioned above, it is notable that 
the two current serving women MPs – Isabelle 
Donald (VP) and Leinavao Tasso (Ind.), both 
from Epi – won their seats on their long-standing 
commitment to voluntary community service 
through local church organisations, rather than 
through the networks of the Vanuatu National 
Council of Women (VNCW) – a major 
stakeholder in VANWIP. VNCW officials are 
often considered by local women’s groups to 
be overpaid and inefficient, beset by the same 
internal squabbling as the major political parties 
and ultimately, the entire state.
CONCLUSIONS
In introducing this paper, I suggested that the 
emphasis on the negative aspects of parliamentary 
politics in Melanesia has obscured the actual 
operation of these parliaments by emphasising 
ideals of parliamentary governance. These 
principles – including lawmaking, oversight and 
representation – form the basis of the institutional 
expectations of parliaments in general, and clearly 
Melanesian parliaments are often weak in these 
technical areas of parliamentary governance. 
 Cultures of Dominance
12
The utility of these aspects of parliamentary 
governance as analytical tools is limited by 
their inability to explain the actual functions of 
Melanesian parliaments, as they currently exist, 
and to explore the dynamics of parliamentary 
politics. That is, to explore what makes Melanesian 
parliamentary politics the way they are, what 
makes Melanesian parliamentarians so resistant 
to external impetus, and what factors, despite the 
aspects of institutional design discussed above, 
promote the entrenched executive dominance 
found in Melanesian parliaments.
The emphasis on political culture found in 
this paper is driven by the need to understand 
the roles of MPs and parliaments in locally 
meaningful ways. To recapitulate this aspect 
of the paper, Melanesian political culture 
draws the attention of MPs away from their 
institutional responsibilities as lawmakers and 
overseers of government. These elements of 
political culture provide some initial reasons 
for the particular weaknesses in lawmaking and 
oversight in Melanesia. The technical aspects of 
parliamentary governance are less important to 
people than access to resources and materials or 
having approachable leaders, enmeshed within 
social networks, in office. MPs who fulfil these 
obligations are more bankable sources of support 
than state institutions. MPs who engage in 
explicit resource distribution are more appealing 
to voters than those with solid track records 
as legislators and overseers of the executive. 
This simple fact may serve to subvert a basic 
building block of democracy – its relevance to 
everyday people. Thus, given the emphasis on 
the redistribution of resources, local people may 
not be able to provide MPs with incentives to 
alter their behaviour unless significant shifts in 
attitude take place among constituents. However, 
the parliament remains a crucial site for contests 
of political power – it is the arena for constituting 
the executive – and is therefore still central to 
local politics. Constituting the executive has 
become the major intention of MPs and to 
protect this dominance, parliamentarians are 
resistant to change, especially external stimulus 
from civil society groups. 
Attention to these aspects of political culture 
may allow for the exploration of parliamentary 
politics without recourse to categorisations of 
Melanesian MPs as ignorant and un-skilled, 
assumptions that will benefit neither them nor 
the people who elected them and which in many 
instances are patently untrue. As I have argued, 
where necessary, Melanesian parliamentarians 
have proved marvellously adroit at following, 
bending or suspending their regulations to 
maximum effect. These factors serve as salutary 
reminders that Melanesian MPs are not always 
ignorant of their powers and responsibilities, even 
if they tend to under-utilise them. Arguably, the 
particular weaknesses in parliamentary functions 
such as oversight and lawmaking are not such 
great concerns for Melanesians. It is important 
to note that the emphasis on these technical 
aspects of parliamentary operation is often more 
important to donors than to local people. Many 
Melanesians consider the cultures of dominance 
that characterise parliamentary politics normal 
and bankable, if not ideal.
It is crucial to recognise that some of the 
problems that beset Pacific parliaments may be 
addressed through institutional strengthening 
or capacity building initiatives. Strengthening 
their regulatory and support infrastructure will 
presumably provide MPs with the resources 
necessary to acquit their responsibilities more 
effectively, even if their involvement in networks 
of resource distribution remain compelling. 
Addressing the problems of members’ capacities 
to acquit their responsibilities through training 
them may overcome some of the shortfalls of 
parliamentary performance in the short term 
but by virtue of the high turnover of MPs in 
Melanesian parliaments many such programs will 
be unsustainable. A medium term goal, therefore, 
should be placed on strengthening secretariats 
and clerk’s offices to allow them to conduct 
members’ induction courses regularly, rather than 
to rely on external institutions to deliver the 
training to MPs.
Civic education programs offer long-term 
strategies for improving community awareness 
about the roles and responsibilities of members 
of parliament, as they will for other formal 
institutions of the state, although clearly the 
capacity of Melanesian governments to deliver 
civic education is also at stake. In the short term, 
ad hoc civic education such as that conducted by 
Wan Smol Bag and other development theatre 
groups have provided readily accessible programs 
for grassroots Melanesians.
Formal parliamentary institutions such as the 
committee system have proved popular among 
donors but their success has been limited due 
to several factors. First, sectoral committees 
have been characteristically weak in facilitating 
community consultation on key issues, 
contributing to the need to create institutions 
such as PNG’s CIMC. Second, they are often 
used in self-serving manners by Melanesian MPs. 
However, clearly they may still serve some use. 
Encouraging secretariats to commission NGOs to 
write briefing papers may strengthen the capacity 
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of committees to fulfil these responsibilities. 
Furthermore, key NGOs may represent potential 
bridges between the ‘state’ and Melanesian 
societies.
Initiatives aimed to encourage the participation 
of women in public decision-making have been 
arduous, although certain returns are notable. 
Drawing on Vanuatu’s example, local legitimacy 
figures more prominently than involvement in 
regionally funded empowerment programs as a 
basis for electoral success. The two approaches, 
however, are mutually reinforcing, with programs 
such as VANWIP contributing to reform among 
political institutions and community work 
providing the basis for grassroots mobilisation.
In conclusion, two qualifications must be 
recognised. First, much of what influences the 
operation of Pacific parliaments is beyond the 
scope of institutional strengthening and capacity 
building; the political cultures of Melanesia and 
more widely in the Pacific are pervasive and 
resilient. It is important, therefore, not to ignore 
the particular national and sub-regional issues; 
not to adopt blanket approaches to parliamentary 
strengthening that merely replicate universal 
principles of governance. Second, expecting 
institutional strengthening projects to facilitate 
the overhaul of the Melanesian polities in their 
totality, without regard for the cultural influences 
on parliamentary politics, is blindly ethnocentric. 
An eye for such differences is crucial to ensuring 
appropriate institutional reforms and capacity 
building programs are instituted.
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